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Abstract
Many real-world networks such as social networks consist of strategic agents. The
topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in determining the ease and
speed with which certain information driven tasks can be accomplished. Consequently,
growing a stable network having a certain desired topology is of interest. Motivated by
this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired topology, under
what conditions would best response link alteration strategies adopted by strategic
agents, uniquely lead to formation of a stable network having the given topology.
This problem is the inverse of the classical network formation problem where we are
concerned with determining stable topologies, given the conditions on the network
parameters. We study this interesting inverse problem by proposing (1) a recursive
model of network formation and (2) a utility model that captures key determinants
of network formation. Building upon these models, we explore relevant topologies
such as star graph, complete graph, bipartite Tura´n graph, and multiple stars with
interconnected centers. We derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these
topologies uniquely emerge, study their social welfare properties, and investigate the
effects of deviating from the derived conditions.
Keywords: strategic networks, network formation, social welfare, game theory, pairwise
stability, network topology, graph edit distance.
1 Introduction
A primary reason for networks such as social networks to be formed is that every person
(or agent or node) gets certain benefits from the network. These benefits assume different
forms in different types of networks. These benefits, however, do not come for free. Every
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node in the network has to incur a certain cost for maintaining links with its immediate
neighbors or direct friends. This cost takes the form of time, money, or effort, depending
on the type of network. Owing to the tension between benefits and costs, self-interested
or rational nodes think strategically while choosing their immediate neighbors. A stable
network that forms out of this process will have a topological structure that is dictated by
the individual utilities and the resulting best response strategies of the nodes.
The underlying social network structure plays a key role in determining the dynamics of
several processes such as, the spread of epidemics [9] and the diffusion of information [19].
This, in turn, affects the decision of which nodes should be selected to be vaccinated [1],
or to trigger a campaign so as to either maximize the spread of certain information [22] or
minimize the spread of an already spreading misinformation [5]. Often, stakeholders such
as a social network owner or planner, who work with the networks so formed, would like the
network to have a certain desirable topology to facilitate efficient handling of information
driven tasks using the network. Typical examples of these tasks include spreading certain
information to nodes (information diffusion), extracting certain critical information from
nodes (information extraction), enabling optimal communication among nodes for maximum
efficiency (knowledge management), etc. If a particular topology is an ideal one for the set
of tasks to be handled, it would be useful to orchestrate network formation in a way that
only the desired topology emerges as the unique stable topology.
A network in the current context can be naturally represented as a graph consisting of
strategic agents called nodes and connections among them called links. Bloch and Jack-
son [4] examine a variety of stability and equilibrium notions that have been used to study
strategic network formation. Our analysis in this paper is based on the notion of pairwise
stability which accounts for bilateral deviations arising from mutual agreement of link cre-
ation between two nodes, that Nash equilibrium fails to capture [19]. Deletion is unilateral
and a node can delete a link without consent from the other node. Consistent with the defi-
nition of pairwise stability, we consider that all nodes are homogeneous and they have global
knowledge of the network (this is a common, well accepted assumption in the literature on
social network formation [19]).
Before we proceed further, we present two important definitions from the literature [19]
for ease of discussion. Let uj(g) denote the utility of node j when the network formed is g.
Definition 1 A network is said to be pairwise stable if it is a best response for a node not
to delete any of its links and there is no incentive for any two unconnected nodes to create
a link between them. So g is pairwise stable if
(a) for each edge e = (i, j) ∈ g, ui(g\{e}) ≤ ui(g) and uj(g\{e}) ≤ uj(g), and
(b) for each edge e′ = (i, j) /∈ g, if ui(g ∪ {e′}) > ui(g), then uj(g ∪ e′) < uj(g).
Definition 2 A network is said to be efficient if the sum of the utilities of the nodes in the
network is maximal. So given a set of nodes N , g is efficient if it maximizes
∑
j∈N uj(g),
that is, for all networks g′ on N ,
∑
j∈N uj(g) ≥
∑
j∈N uj(g
′).
Every network has certain parameters that influence its evolution process. We refer
to the tuple of values of these parameters as conditions on the network. By conditions
on a network, we mean a listing of the range of values taken by the various parameters
that influence network formation, including the relations between these parameters. For
example, let b1 be the benefit that a node gets from each of its direct neighbors, b2 be the
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benefit that it gets from each node that is at distance two from it, and c be the cost it pays
for maintaining link with each of its direct neighbors. In real-world networks, it is often
the case that 0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 and c ≥ 0. The list of relations, say (1) 0 < b2 < b1 and (2)
b1 − b2 < c < b1, are the conditions on the network. Based on these conditions, the utilities
of the involved nodes are determined, which in turn affect their (link addition/deletion)
strategies, hence influencing the process of formation of that network. Throughout this
paper, we ignore enlisting trivial conditions such as 0 ≤ b2 ≤ b1 and c ≥ 0.
In general, the evolution of a real-world social network would depend on several other
factors such as the information diffusing through the network [8, 36]. For simplicity, we
make a well accepted assumption that the network evolves purely based on the conditions
on it and does not depend on any other factor.
2 Motivation
One of the key problems addressed in the literature on social network formation is: given
a set of self-interested nodes and a model of social network formation, which topologies are
stable and which ones are efficient. The trade-off between stability and efficiency is a key
topic of interest and concern in the literature on social network formation [18, 19].
This work focuses on the inverse problem, namely, given a certain desired topology,
under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by
self-interested agents, uniquely lead to the formation of a stable (and perhaps efficient)
network with that topology. The problem becomes important because networks, such as an
organizational network of a global company, play an important role in a variety of knowledge
management, information extraction, and information diffusion tasks. The topology of these
networks is one of the major factors that decides the ease and speed with which the above
tasks can be accomplished. In short, a certain topology might serve the interests of the
network owner better.
In social networks, in general, it is difficult to figure out what the desired topology is.
Moreover, it is possible that the social network is being formed for more than one reason.
It can, however, be argued that given a set of individuals, there may not exist a unique
social network amongst them. For instance, there may exist several networks like friendship
network, collaboration network, organizational network, etc. on the same set of nodes.
Different networks have different cost and benefit parameters, for example, from a mutual
connection, two nodes may gain more in collaboration network than in friendship network,
and also pay more cost. Furthermore, in real-world networks, a link between two nodes in
one network may influence the corresponding link in another network. The influence may
be positive (friendship trust leads to business trust) or negative (time spent for maintaining
link in one network may adversely affect the corresponding link in another network). For
simplicity, we consider these various networks to be formed independently of each other. A
way to look at the problem under consideration is that, we focus on one such network at a
time and derive conditions so that it has the desired topology or structure.
In this paper, for the sake of brevity, we consider only a representative set of commonly
encountered topologies for investigation. However, our approach is general and can be used
to study other topologies, albeit with more involved analysis. We motivate our investigation
further with the help of several relevant topologies shown in Figure 1.
Consider a network where there is a need to rapidly spread certain critical information,
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Figure 1: Relevant topologies investigated in this work
requiring redundant ways of communication to account for any link failures. The information
may be received by any of the nodes and it is important that all other nodes also get the
information at the earliest. In such cases, a complete network (Figure 1(b)) would be ideal.
In general, if the information received by any node is required to be propagated throughout
the network within a certain number of steps d, the network’s diameter should be bounded
by the number d.
Consider a different scenario where the time required to spread the information is critical,
but there is also a need for moderation to verify the authenticity of the information before
spreading it to the other nodes in the network (for example, it could be a rumor). Here a star
network (Figure 1(a)) would be desirable since the center would act as a moderator and any
information that originates in any part of the network has to flow through the moderator
before it reaches other nodes in the network. Virus inoculation is a related example where
a star network would be desirable since vaccinating the center may be sufficient to prevent
spread of the virus to other parts of the network, thus reducing the cost of vaccination.
Our next example concerns two sections of a society where some or all members of a
section receive certain information simultaneously. The objective here is to forward the
information to the other section. Moreover, it is desirable to not have intra-section links to
save on resources. In this case, it would be desirable to have a bipartite network. Moreover,
if the information is critical and urgent, requiring redundancy, a complete bipartite network
would be desirable. A bipartite Tura´n network (Figure 1(c)) is a practical special case where
both sections are required to be nearly of equal sizes.
Consider a generalization of the star network where there are k centers and the leaf nodes
are evenly distributed among them, that is, the difference between the number of leaf nodes
connected to any two centers, is at most one. Such a network would be desirable when the
number of nodes is expected to be very large and there is a need for decentralization for
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efficiently controlling information in the network. We call such a network, k-star network
(Figures 1(d-e)).
For similar reasons, if fast information extraction is the main criterion, certain topologies
may be better than others. Information extraction in social networks can be thought of as
the reverse of information diffusion. Also, an information extraction or search algorithm
would work better on some topologies than others.
The problem under study also assumes importance in knowledge management. McIner-
ney [25] defines knowledge management as an effort to increase useful knowledge within an
organization, and highlights that the ways to do this include encouraging communication,
offering opportunities to learn, and promoting the sharing of appropriate knowledge arti-
facts. An organization may want to develop a particular network within, so as to make the
most of knowledge management. A complete network would be desirable if the nodes are
trustworthy with no possibility of manipulation. For practical reasons, an organization may
want nodes of different sections to communicate with each other and not within sections so
that each node can aggregate knowledge received from nodes belonging to the other section,
in its own way. A bipartite Tura´n network would be desirable in such a case. Such a net-
work may also be more desirable than the complete network in order to prevent inessential
investment of time for communication within a section.
Similarly, for a variety of reasons, there may be a need to form networks having certain
other structural properties. So depending on the tasks for which the network would be used,
a certain topology might be more desirable than others. This provides the motivation for
our work.
3 Relevant Work
Models of network formation in literature can be broadly classified as either simultaneous
move models or sequential move models. Jackson and Wolinsky [21] propose a simultaneous
move game model where nodes simultaneously propose the set of nodes with whom they
want to create a link, and a link is created between any two nodes if they mutually propose a
link to each other. Aumann and Myerson [3] provide a sequential move game model where
nodes are farsighted, whereas Watts [31] considers a sequential move game model where
nodes are myopic. In both of these approaches and in any sequential network formation
model in general, the resulting network is based on the ordering in which links are altered
and owing to the assumed random ordering, it is not clear which networks would emerge.
The modeling of strategic formation in a general network setting was first studied by
Jackson and Wolinsky [21] by proposing a utility model called symmetric connections model.
This widely cited model, however, does not capture many key determinants involved in
strategic network formation. Since then, several utility models have been proposed in liter-
ature in the effort of capturing these determinants. Jackson [16] reviews several such models
in the literature and highlights that pairwise stable networks may not exist in some settings.
Hellmann and Staudigl [13] provide a survey of random graph models and game theoretic
models for analyzing network evolution.
Given a network, Myerson value [27] gives an allocation to each of the involved nodes
based on certain desirable properties. Jackson [17] proposes a family of allocation rules that
consider alternative network structures when allocating the value generated by the network
to the individual nodes. Narayanam and Narahari [28] investigate the topologies of networks
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formed with a generic model based on value functions and analyze resulting networks using
Myerson value. There have also been studies on stability and efficiency of specific networks
such as R&D networks [24]. Atalay [2] studies sources of variation in social networks by
extending the model in [15] by allowing agents to have varying abilities to attract contacts.
Goyal and Joshi [11] explore two specific models of network formation and arrive at
circumstances under which networks exhibit an unequal distribution of connections across
agents. Goyal and Vega-Redondo [12] propose a non-cooperative game model capturing
bridging benefits wherein they introduce the concept of essential nodes, which is a part of
our proposed utility model. Their model, however, does not capture the decaying of benefits
obtained from remote nodes. Kleinberg et al. [23] propose a localized model that considers
benefits that a node gets by bridging any pair of its neighbors separated by a path of length
2. Their model does not capture indirect benefits and bridging benefits that nodes can gain
by being intermediaries between non-neighbors which are separated by a path of length
greater than 2. Under another localized model where a node’s bridging benefits depend on
its clustering coefficient, Vallam et al. [30] study stable and efficient topologies.
Hummon [14] uses agent-based simulation approaches to explore the dynamics of network
evolution based on the symmetric connections model. Doreian [7], given some conditions
on a network, analytically arrives at specific networks that are pairwise stable using the
same model. However, the complexity of analysis increases exponentially with the number
of nodes and the analysis in the paper is limited to a network with only five nodes. Some
gaps in this analysis are addressed by Xie and Cui [33, 34].
Most existing models of social network formation assume that all nodes are present
throughout the evolution of a network, thus allowing nodes to form links that may be
inconsistent with the desired network. For instance, if the desired topology is a star, it is
desirable to have conditions that ensure a link between two nodes, of which one would play
the role of the center. But with the same conditions, links between other pairs would be
created with high probability, leading to inconsistencies with the star topology. Also, with
all nodes present in an unorganized network, a random ordering over them in sequential
network formation models adds to the complexity of analysis. However, in most social
networks, not all nodes are present from beginning itself. A network starts building up from
a few nodes and gradually grows to its full form. Our model captures such a type of network
formation.
There have been a few approaches earlier to design incentives for nodes so that the
resulting network is efficient. Woodard and Parkes [32] use mechanism design to ensure
that the outcome is an efficient network. Mutuswami and Winter [26] design a mechanism
that ensures efficiency, budget balance, and equity. Though it is often assumed that the
welfare of a network is based only on its efficiency, there are many situations where this may
not be true. A network may not be efficient in itself, but it may be desirable for reasons
external to the network, as explained in Section 2.
4 Contributions of this Paper
In this paper, we study the inverse of the classical network formation problem, that is, under
what conditions would the desired topology uniquely emerge when agents adopt their best
response strategies. Our specific contributions are summarized below.
• We propose a recursive model of network formation, with which we can guarantee
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that a network being formed retains a designated topology in each of its stable states.
Our model ensures that, for common network topologies, the analysis can be carried
out independent of the current number of nodes in the network and also independent
of the upper bound on the number of nodes in the network. The utility model we
propose captures most key aspects relevant to strategic network formation: (a) benefits
from immediate neighbors, (b) costs of maintaining links with immediate neighbors,
(c) benefits from indirect neighbors, (d) bridging benefits, (e) intermediation rents,
and (f) an entry fee for entering the network. We then present our procedure for
deriving sufficient conditions for the formation of a given topology as the unique one.
(Section 5)
• Using the proposed models, we study common and important networks, namely, star
network, complete network, bipartite Tura´n network, and k-star network, and derive
sufficient conditions under which these topologies uniquely emerge. We also investigate
the efficiency (or social welfare) properties of the above network topologies. (Section 6)
• We introduce the concept of dynamic conditions on a network and study the effects
of deviation from the derived sufficient conditions on the resulting network, using the
notion of graph edit distance. In this process, we develop a polynomial time algorithm
for computing graph edit distance between a given graph and a corresponding k-star
graph. (Section 7)
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed effort in investigating the problem
of obtaining a desired topology uniquely in social network formation.
5 The Model
We consider the process of formation of a network consisting of strategic nodes, where each
node aims at maximizing its utility it gets from the network.
5.1 A Recursive Model of Network Formation
The network consists of n nodes at any given time, where n could vary over time. The
process starts with one node, whose only strategy is to remain in its current state. The
strategy of the second node is to either (a) not enter the network or (b) propose a link with
the first node. We make a natural assumption that in order to be a part of the network,
the second node has to propose a link with the first node and not vice versa. Based on the
model under study, the first node may or may not get to decide whether to accept this link.
If this link is created, the second node successfully enters the network. Following this, the
network evolves to reach a stable state after which, the third node considers entering the
network. The third node can enter the network by successfully creating link(s) with one
or both of the first two nodes. In this paper, we consider that at most one link is altered
at a time, and so the third node can enter the network by successfully creating a link with
exactly one of the already present nodes in the network. If it does, the network of these three
nodes evolves. Once the network reaches a stable state, the fourth node considers entering
the network, and this process continues. Note that in the above process, no node in the
network of n − 1 nodes can create a link with the newly entering nth node until the latter
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Figure 2: Proposed recursive model of network formation
proposes and successfully creates a link in order to enter the network. After the new node
enters the network successfully, the network evolves until it reaches a stable state consisting
of n nodes. Following this, a new (n+ 1)th node considers entering the network and the
process goes on recursively. The assumption that a node considers entering the network only
when it is stable may seem unnatural in general networks, but can be justified in networks
where entry of nodes can be controlled by a network administrator. This recursive model
is depicted in Figure 2. Note that the model is not based on any utility model, network
evolution model, or equilibrium notion.
It can be observed at first glance that, if at some point of time, a new node fails to enter
the network by failing to create a link with some existing node, the network will cease to
grow. In such cases, it may seem that Figure 2 goes into infinite loop for no reason, while
it may have just pointed to an exit. The argument holds for the current social network
models where the cost and benefit parameters, and hence the conditions on the network,
are assumed to remain unchanged throughout the network formation process. But in real-
world networks, this is often not the case and the conditions may vary over time or evolve
owing to some internal or external factors. For instance, if the individual workload on the
employees increases, the cost of maintaining link with each other also increases. On the
other hand, if the workload is of collaborative nature, then the benefit parameters attain an
increased value. It is possible that no node successfully enters the network for some time,
but with changes in the conditions, nodes may resume entering and the network may start
to grow again. We explore this concept of dynamic conditions on a network in Section 7.
5.2 Dynamics of Network Evolution
The model of network evolution considered in this paper is based on a sequential move game
[31]. During the evolution phase, nodes which get to make a move are chosen at random at
all time. Each node has a set of strategies at any given time and when it gets a chance to
make a move, it chooses its myopic best response strategy which maximizes its immediate
utility. A strategy can be of one of the three types, namely (a) creating a link with a node
that is not its immediate neighbor, (b) deleting a link with an immediate neighbor, or (c)
maintaining status quo. Note that a node will compute whether a link it proposes, decreases
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utility of the other node, because if it does, it is not its myopic best response as the link will
not be accepted by the latter. Moreover, consistent with the notion of pairwise stability, if
a node gets to make a move and altering a link does not strictly increase its utility, then
it prefers not to alter it. The aforementioned sequential move evolution process can be
represented as an extensive form game tree.
5.2.1 Game Tree
The entry of each node in the network results in one game tree, and so the network formation
process results in a series of game trees, each tree corresponding to a sequential move game
(see Figure 4). Each branch represents a possible transition from a network state, owing to
decision made by a node. So, the root of a game tree represents the network state in which
a new node considers entering the network.
A way to find an equilibrium in an extensive form game consisting of farsighted players, is
to use backward induction [29]. However, in our game, the players have bounded rationality,
that is, their best response strategies are myopic. So instead of the regular backward
induction approach or the bottom-up approach, we take a top-down approach for ease of
understanding. We now recall the definition of an improving path [20].
Definition 3 An improving path is a sequence of networks, where each transition is ob-
tained by either any two nodes choosing to add a mutual link or any node choosing to delete
any of its links.
Thus, a pairwise stable network is one from which there is no improving path leaving
it. The notion of improving paths is based on the assumption of myopic agents, who make
their decisions without considering how their actions affect the decisions of other nodes and
hence the evolution of the network.
5.2.2 Notion of Types
As the order in which nodes take decisions is random, in a general game, the number of
branches arising from each state in the game tree depends on the number of nodes, n, as
well as the number of possible direct connections each node can be involved in (or number
of possible direct connections with respect to each node), n− 1. The complexity of analysis
can, however, be significantly reduced by the notion of types using which, several nodes
and links can be analyzed at once. This is a widely used technique in analyzing pairwise
stability of a network. We now explain the notion of types in detail.
Definition 4 Two nodes A and C of a graph g are of the same type if there exists an
automorphism f : V (g)→ V (g) such that f(A) = C, where V (g) is the vertex set of g.
The implication of nodes being of the same type is that, for any automorphism f , if a best
response strategy of node A is to alter its link with node D, then a best response strategy
of f(A) is to alter its link with f(D). So at any point of time, it is sufficient to consider the
best response strategies of one node of each type.
Definition 5 Two connections with respect to a node B, connections BA and BC, are of
the same type if there exists an automorphism f such that f(A) = C and f(B) = B.
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Figure 3: A 4-star graph
For example, in Figure 3, nodes G and H are
of the same type. Also, the two possible connec-
tions MG and MH with respect to node M , are
of the same type. But the possible connections
EG and EH with respect to node E, are not of
the same type. So, these two strategies of node
E, namely, connecting with node G and con-
necting with node H, form different branches in
the game tree, implying that the utilities aris-
ing from these two types of connections are not
necessarily equal.
5.2.3 Directing Network Evolution
Our procedure for deriving sufficient conditions for the formation of a given topology as the
unique topology, is modeled on the lines of mathematical induction. Consider a base case
network with very few nodes (two in our analysis). We derive conditions so that the network
formed with these few nodes has the desired topology. Then using induction, we assume
that a network with n − 1 nodes has the desired topology, and derive conditions so that,
the network with n nodes, also has that topology. Without loss of generality, we explain
this procedure with the example of star topology, referring to the game tree in Figure 4.
Assuming that the network formed with n − 1 nodes is a star, our objective is to derive
conditions so that the network of n nodes is also a star.
In Figure 4, at the root of the game tree, node A is the newly entering nth node and
the network is in state 0, where a star with n − 1 nodes is already formed. Recall that
the complexity of analyzing a network depends on the number of different types of nodes
as well as the number of different types of possible connections with respect to a node in
that network. Note that in state 0, with respect to node A, there are two types of possible
connections: (a) with the center and (b) with a leaf node. In states 1, 3, 4 and 5, there are
two types of nodes, and two types of possible connections with respect to a leaf node and
one with respect to the center. It will be seen that, the network is directed to not enter
state 2, so even though there are four types of nodes in that state, it is not a matter of
concern.
Let uj(s) be the utility of node j when the network is in state s. In state 0, as the
newly entering node A gets to make the first move, we want it to connect to the center by
choosing the improving path that transits from state 0 to state 1. So utility of node A in
state 1 should be greater than that in state 0, that is, uA(1) > uA(0). Similarly, for node
B to accept the link from node A, B’s utility should not decrease, that is uB(1) ≥ uB(0).
We do not want node A to connect to any of the leaf nodes, that is, we do not want the
network to enter state 2. Note that as we are interested in sufficient conditions, we are not
concerned if there exists an improving path from state 2 that eventually results in a star
(we discard state 2 in order to shorten the analysis). One way to ensure that the network
does not enter state 2, irrespective of whether it lies on an improving path, is by making it
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Figure 4: Directing the network evolution for the formation of star topology uniquely
less favorable for node A than the desired state 1, that is, uA(2) < uA(1). Another way to
ensure the same is by a condition for a leaf node such that, accepting a link from node A
decreases its utility, and so the leaf node does not accept the link, thus forcing node A to
connect to the center. That is, uj(2) < uj(0) for any leaf node j. Thus the network enters
state 1, which is our desired state.
To ensure pairwise stability of our desired state, no improving paths should lead out of
it, for which we need to consider two cases. First, when node B gets to make its move, it
should not break any of its links (state 5), that is uB(1) ≥ uB(5). Second, when any of the
leaf nodes is chosen at random, it should neither create a link with some other leaf node
(state 3), nor delete its link with the center (state 4). The corresponding conditions are
uj(1) ≥ uj(3) and uj(1) ≥ uj(4) for any leaf node j.
Thus we direct the network evolution along a desired improving path by imposing a set
of conditions, ensuring that the resulting network is in the desired state or has the desired
topology uniquely. In the evolution process of a network consisting of homogeneous nodes,
the number of branches from a state of the game tree depends on the number of different
types of nodes and the number of different types of possible connections with respect to a
node, at that particular instant. As we are primarily interested in the formation of special
topologies in a recursive manner (nodes are already organized according to the topology
and the objective is to extend the topology to that with one more node, so the existing
nodes play the same role as before, and most or all of the existing links do not change),
the number of different types of nodes as well as the number of different types of possible
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connections with respect to a node, are small constants at any instant, thus simplifying the
analysis.
5.3 The Utility Model
Keeping in view the necessity of solving the problem in a setting that reflects real-world
networks in a reasonably general way, we propose a utility model that captures several key
determinants of social network formation. In particular, our model is a considerable gener-
alization of the extensively explored symmetric connections model [21] and also builds upon
other well known models in literature [12, 23]. Furthermore, as nodes have global knowledge
of existing nodes in the network while making their decisions (for instance, proposing a link
with a faraway node), we propose a utility model that captures the global view of indirect
and bridging benefits.
Definition 6 [12] A node j is said to be essential for nodes y and z if j lies on every path
joining y and z.
Whenever nodes y and z are directly connected, they get the entire benefits arising from
the direct link. On the other hand, when they are indirectly connected with the help of
other nodes, of which at least one is essential, y and z lose some fraction of the benefits
arising from their communication, in the form of intermediation rents paid to the essential
nodes without whom the communication is infeasible.
Let E(x, y) be the set of essential nodes connecting nodes y and z. The model proposed
by Goyal and Vega-Redondo [12] suggests that the benefits produced by y and z be divided
in a way that x, y, and the nodes in E(x, y) get fraction 1|E(x,y)|+2 each. However, in practice,
if nodes y and z can communicate owing to the essential nodes connecting them, that pair
would want to enjoy at least some fraction of the benefits obtained from each other, since
that pair is the real producer of these benefits (and possess human characteristics such as
ego and prestige). That is, the pair would not agree to give away more than some fraction,
say γ, to the corresponding set of essential nodes. As this fact is known to all nodes, in
particular, to the set of essential nodes, they as a whole will charge the pair exactly γ
fraction as intermediation rents. As each essential node in the set is equally important for
making the communication feasible, it is reasonable to assume that the intermediation rents
are equally divided among them.
It can be noted that nodes which lie on every shortest path connecting y and z, but
are not essential for connecting them, also have bargaining power, since without them, the
indirect benefits obtained from the communication would be less. And so, they should get
some fraction proportional to their differential contribution, that is, the indirect benefits
produced through the shortest path minus the indirect benefits produced through the second
shortest path. But, for simplicity of analysis, we ignore this differential contribution and
assume that nodes that lie on path(s) connecting y and z, but are not essential, do not get
any share of the intermediation rents. So, when y and z are indirectly connected with the
help of other nodes of which none is essential, they get the entire indirect benefits arising
from their communication.
We now describe the determinants of network formation that our model captures, and
thus obtain expression for the utility function. Let N be the set of nodes present in the
given network, dj be the degree of node j, l(j, w) be the shortest path distance between
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nodes j and w, bi be the benefit obtained from a node at distance i in absence of rents
(assume b∞ = 0), and c be the cost for maintaining link with an immediate neighbor.
(1) Network Entry Fee: Since nodes enter a network one by one, we introduce the
notion of network entry fee. This fee corresponds to some cost a node has to bear in order to
be a part of the network. It is clear that, if a newly entering node wants its first connection
to be with an existing node which is of high importance or degree, then it has to spend
more time or effort. So we assume the entry fee that the former pays to be an increasing
function of the latter’s degree, say dT. For simplicity of analysis, we assume the fee to be
directly proportional to dT and call the proportionality constant, network entry factor c0.
(2) Direct Benefits: These benefits are obtained from immediate neighbors in a
network. For a node j, these benefits equal b1 times dj.
(3) Link Costs: These costs are the amount of resources like time, money, and effort
a node has to spend in order to maintain links with its immediate neighbors. For a node j,
these costs equal c times dj.
(4) Indirect Benefits: These benefits are obtained from indirect neighbors, and these
decay with distance (bi+1 < bi). In the absence of rents, the total indirect benefits that a
node j gets is
∑
w∈N, l(j,w)>1 bl(j,w).
(5) Intermediation Rents: Nodes pay a fraction γ (0 ≤ γ < 1) of the indirect bene-
fits, in the form of additional favors or monetary transfers to the corresponding set of essen-
tial nodes, if any. The loss incurred by a node j due to these rents is
∑
w∈N, E(j,w) 6=φ γbl(j,w).
(6) Bridging Benefits: Consider a node j ∈ E(y, z). Both y and z benefit bl(y,z)
each and so this indirect connection produces a total benefit of 2bl(y,z). As described ear-
lier, each node from the set E(y, z) gets a fraction γ|E(y,z)| , the absolute benefits being(
γ
|E(y,z)|
)
2bl(y,z). So the bridging benefits obtained by a node j from the entire network is∑
j∈E(y,z), {y,z}⊆N
(
γ
|E(y,z)|
)
2bl(y,z).
Utility Function: The utility of a node j is a function of the network, that is, uj :
g → R. We drop the notation g from the following equation for readability. Summing up
all the aforementioned determinants of network formation that our model captures, we get
uj =− c0dT(j)I{j=NE} + dj(b1 − c) +
∑
w∈N
l(j,w)>1
bl(j,w)
−
∑
w∈N
E(j,w) 6=φ
γbl(j,w) +
∑
j∈E(y,z)
{y,z}⊆N
(
γ
|E(y, z)|
)
2bl(y,z)
(1)
where T(j) is the node to which node j connects to enter the network, and I{j=NE} is 1
when j is a newly entering node about to create its first link, else it is 0.
6 Analysis of Relevant Topologies
Using the proposed model of recursive and sequential network formation and the proposed
utility model, we provide sufficient conditions under which several relevant network topolo-
gies, namely star, complete graph, bipartite Tura´n graph, 2-star, and k-star, uniquely emerge
as pairwise stable networks. Note that as the conditions derived for any particular topol-
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ogy are sufficient, there may exist alternative conditions that result in the same topology
uniquely.
6.1 Sufficient Conditions for the Formation of Relevant Topolo-
gies Uniquely
We use Equation (1) for mathematically deriving the conditions.
Proposition 1 For a network, if b1 − b2 + γb2 ≤ c < b1 and c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b3), the
unique resulting topology is star.
Proof Refer to Figure 4 throughout the proof. For the base case of n = 2, the requirement
for the second node to propose a link to the first is that its utility should become strictly
positive. Also as the first node has degree 0, there is no entry fee.
0 < b1 − c ⇐⇒ c < b1 (2)
Now, consider a star consisting of n−1 nodes. Let the newly entering nth node get to make
a decision of whether to enter the network. For n ≥ 3, if the entering node connects to the
center, it gets indirect benefits of b2 each from n−2 nodes. But as the center is essential for
enabling communication between newly entering node and other leaf nodes, the new node
has to pay γ fraction of these benefits to the center. Also, it has to pay an entry fee of
(n− 2)c0 as the degree of center is n− 2. So in Figure 4, uA(0) < uA(1) gives
0 < b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 − (n− 2)c0
⇐⇒ c < b1 + (n− 2) ((1− γ) b2 − c0)
As it needs to be true for all n ≥ 3, we set the condition to
c < min
n≥3
{
b1 + (n− 2) ((1− γ) b2 − c0)
}
⇐= c < b1 + (1− γ) b2 − c0 (3)
The last step is obtained so that the condition for link cost is independent of the upper
limit on the number of nodes, by enforcing
c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2 (4)
which enables us to substitute n = 3 and the condition holds for all n ≥ 3.
For the center to accept a link from the newly entering node, we need to have uB(0) ≤ uB(1).
For n = 2, the requirement for the first node to accept link from the second node is 0 ≤ b1−c
which is satisfied by Inequality (2). For n = 3, as the center is essential for connecting the
other two nodes separated by distance two, it gets γ fraction of b2 from both the nodes. So
it gets bridging benefits of 2γb2.
b1 − c ≤ 2(b1 − c) + 2γb2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 + 2γb2
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This condition is satisfied by Inequality (2). For n ≥ 4, prior to entry of the new node, the
center alone bridged
(
n− 2
2
)
pairs of nodes at distance two from each other, while after
connecting with the new node, the center is the sole essential node for
(
n− 1
2
)
such pairs.
So the required condition:
(n− 2)(b1 − c) + γ
(
n− 2
2
)
2b2 ≤ (n− 1)(b1 − c) + γ
(
n− 1
2
)
2b2
This condition is satisfied by Inequality (2) for all n ≥ 4.
For the newly entering node to prefer the center over a leaf node as its first connection (not
applicable for n = 2 and 3), we need uA(1) > uA(2).
b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 − (n− 2)c0 > b1 − c+ (1− γ) b2 − c0 + (n− 3) (1− γ) b3
⇐⇒ c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b3) (5)
Alternatively, the newly entering node may want to connect to the leaf node, but the leaf
node’s utility decreases. In that case, the alternative condition can be uj(2) < uj(0) for
j = C,D,E, F . Note that this leaf node gets bridging benefits of 2γb2 for being essential for
indirectly connecting the new node with the center. Also, as it is one of the two essential
nodes for indirectly connecting the new node with the other n − 3 leaf nodes (the other
being the center), it gets bridging benefits of (n− 3)(γ
2
)2b3 = (n− 3)γb3.
b1 − c+ (n− 3) (1− γ) b2 > 2(b1 − c) + (n− 3) (1− γ) b2 + 2γb2 + (n− 3)γb3
which gives c > b1 + 2γb2 + (n − 3)γb3. But this is inconsistent with the condition in
Inequality (2). So in order to ensure that the newly entering node connects to the center
and not to any of the leaf nodes, we use Inequality (5).
Now that a star of n nodes is formed, we ensure its pairwise stability by deriving con-
ditions for the same. Firstly, we ensure that the center does not delete any of its links. So
we need uB(1) ≥ uB(5). Note that from the center’s point of view, state 5 is same as state
0 and as we have seen earlier that uB(0) ≤ uB(1), the required condition uB(5) ≤ uB(1) is
already ensured.
Next, no two leaf nodes should form a link between them. So we should ensure that, not
creating a link between them is at least as good for them as creating, that is uj(1) ≥ uj(3)
for any leaf node j. This condition is applicable for n ≥ 3.
b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 ≥ 2(b1 − c) + (n− 3) (1− γ) b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 (6)
For a leaf node to not delete its link with the center, we need uj(1) ≥ uj(4) for any leaf
node j. For n ≥ 2, we have
b1 − c+ (n− 2) (1− γ) b2 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 + (n− 2) (1− γ) b2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (2) for n ≥ 2.
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Note that Inequalities (2) and (5) put together are stronger than Inequalities (3) and
(4) combined. We get the required result using Inequalities (2), (5) and (6).
We provide the proofs of the remaining results of this section in Appendices A through
E.
Proposition 2 For a network, if c < b1 − bd+1 and c0 ≤ (1 − γ)b2, the resulting diameter
is at most d.
The following corollary results when d = 1.
Corollary 1 For a network, if c < b1− b2 and c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2, the unique resulting topology
is complete graph.
Proposition 3 For a network with γ < b2−b3
3b2−b3 , if b1 − b2 + γ (3b2 − b3) < c < b1 − b3 and
(1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2, the unique resulting topology is bipartite Tura´n graph.
Proposition 4 Let σ be the upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network
and λ = dσ
2
− 1e (2b2 − b3). Then, if (1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b4) and either
(i) γ < min
{
b2−b3
λ−b3 ,
b3
b2+b3
}
and b1 − b3 + γ(b2 + b3) ≤ c < b1, or
(ii) b2−b3
λ−b3 ≤ γ < min
{
b2
λ+b2
, b3
b2+b3
}
and b1 − b2 + γb2 + γλ ≤ c < b1,
the unique resulting topology is 2-star.
The following corollary transforms the above conditions in (i) to be independent of the
upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network.
Corollary 2 For a network with γ = 0, if b1 − b3 ≤ c < b1 and b2 − b3 < c0 < b2 − b4, the
unique resulting topology is 2-star.
We define base graph of a network formation process as the graph from which the process
starts. The conditions derived for the formation of the above networks are obtained starting
from the graph consisting of a single node (corresponding to the base case of formation of
a network with n = 2). Now for certain topologies to be well-defined, it is required that
the network has a certain minimum number of nodes. For instance, for a network to have
a well-defined k-star topology, it should consist of at least 2k nodes (complete network on
k centers with one leaf node connected to each center). So it is reasonable to consider this
network of 2k nodes as a base graph for forming a k-star network. Moreover, in case of
some topologies (under a given utility model), the conditions required for its formation on
discretely small number of nodes, may be inconsistent with that required on arbitrarily large
number of nodes. We will now see that, under the proposed network formation and utility
models, k-star (k ≥ 3) is one such topology; and a way to circumvent this problem is to
start the network formation process from the aforementioned base graph.
Note that in a real-world network, the upper bound on the number of nodes is unknown
to the network owner. So it is essential that, irrespective of the number of nodes, the desired
topology is formed and is stable. That is, the conditions on the network must be set such
that the entire family of networks having that topology, is stable.
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Lemma 1 Under the proposed utility model, for the entire family of k-star networks (given
some k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b1 − b3.
It can be seen that the conditions necessary for the family of k-star networks to be
pairwise stable (Lemma 1) are sufficient conditions for the formation of a 2-star network
uniquely, when b2−b3 < c0 < b2−b4 (Corollary 2). When c0 < b2−b3, these conditions γ = 0
and c = b1− b3, are sufficient for the formation of a star topology uniquely (Proposition 1).
When b2− b4 < c0 < b2, these necessary conditions form a cycle among the initially entered
nodes, but fails to form a clique among k nodes even as more nodes enter the network,
thus making it inconsistent with the k-star topology. It can be similarly seen that for other
values of c0 including the boundary cases c0 = b2 − b3 and c0 = b2 − b4, the network so
formed is not consistent with k-star topology for any k ≥ 3. So we have that, under the
proposed network formation and utility models, with the requirement that the entire family
be pairwise stable, no k-star network (given some k ≥ 3) can be formed starting with a
network consisting of a single node.
A reasonable solution to overcome this problem is to start the network formation process
from some other base graph. Such a graph can be obtained by external methods such as
providing additional incentives to its nodes. For initializing the formation of k-star, as
mentioned earlier, the base graph can be taken to be the complete network on the k centers,
with the centers connected to one leaf node each. As the base graph consists of 2k nodes,
the induction starts with the base case for formation of k-star network with n = 2k + 1.
Proposition 5 For a network starting with the base graph for k-star (given some k ≥ 3),
and γ = 0, if c = b1 − b3 and b2 − b3 < c0 < b2 − b4, the unique resulting topology is k-star.
6.2 Intuition Behind the Sufficient Conditions
The network entry fee has an impact on the resulting topology as seen from the above
propositions. For instance, in Propositions 1 and 3, the intervals spanned by the values of
c and γ may intersect, but the values of network entry factor c0 span mutually exclusive
intervals separated at (1 − γ)(b2 − b3). In case of star, c0 is low and so a newly entering
node can afford to connect to the center, which in general, has very high degree. In case of
bipartite Tura´n graph, it is important to ensure that the sizes of the two partitions are as
equal as possible. As c0 is high, a newly entering node connects to a node with a lower degree
(whenever applicable), that is, to a node that belongs to the partition with more number
of nodes. Hence the newly entering node potentially becomes a part of the partition with
fewer number of nodes, thus maintaining a balance between the sizes of the two partitions.
In case of k-star, as the objective is to ensure that a newly entering node connects to a node
with moderate degree, the network entry factor is not so high that a newly entering node
prefers connecting to a leaf node and not so low that it prefers connecting to a center with
the highest degree. This intuition is clearly reflected in Propositions 4 and 5 where c0 takes
intermediate values. In general, network entry factor c0 plays an important role in dictating
the degree distribution of the resulting network; a higher value of c0 lays the foundation for
formation of a more regular graph.
As c increases, the desirability of a node to form links decreases. This is clear from
Proposition 2 which says that, as c decreases, nodes would create more links, hence effec-
tively reducing the network diameter. In particular, a complete network is formed when
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the costs of maintaining links is extremely low, as reflected in Corollary 1. The remaining
topologies are formed in the intermediate ranges of c.
From Propositions 3, 4 and 5, it can be seen that the feasibility of a network being
formed depends on the values of γ as well, which arises owing to contrasting densities of
connections in a network. For instance, in a bipartite Tura´n network, nodes belonging
to different partitions are densely connected with each other, while that within the same
partition are not connected at all. Similarly, in a k-star network, there is an extreme contrast
in the densities of connections (dense amongst centers and sparse for leaf nodes).
6.3 Connection to Efficiency
We now analyze efficiency of the considered networks. As the derived conditions are suffi-
cient, there may exist other sets of conditions that uniquely result in a given topology. We
analyze the efficiency assuming that the networks are formed using the derived conditions.
From Equation (1), the intermediation rents are transferable among the nodes, and so
do not affect the efficiency of a network. Furthermore, the network entry fee is paid by any
node at most once, and so does not account for efficiency in the long run. So the expression
for efficiency of a network is
∑
j∈N
(
dj(b1 − c) +
∑
w∈N
l(j,w)>1
bl(j,w)
)
The following result follows from the analysis by Narayanam and Narahari [28].
Lemma 2 Let µ be the number of nodes in network.
(a) If c < b1 − b2, complete graph is uniquely efficient.
(b) If b1 − b2 < c ≤ b1 +
(
µ−2
2
)
b2, star is the unique efficient topology.
(c) If c > b1 +
(
µ−2
2
)
b2, null graph is uniquely efficient.
The null network in the proposed model of recursive network formation corresponds to
a single node to which no other node prefers to connect, and so the network does not grow.
Proposition 6 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, null network, star network, and
complete network are efficient.
Proof It is easy to see that irrespective of the value of c0, if c > b1, no node, external to the
network, connects to the only node in the network and hence, does not enter the network.
Such a network is trivially efficient as in the range c > b1, it is a star of one node and also
a null network. It is also clear that the star network and the complete network are efficient
as the conditions on c from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, respectively, form a subset of the
range of c in which these topologies are respectively efficient.
It can be seen that when the number of nodes in the network is small, the absolute
difference between the efficiency of the resulting network and that of the efficient network
is also small, and hence the network owner will not be too concerned about the efficiency of
the network. So for the following propositions, we make a reasonable assumption that the
number of nodes in the network is sufficiently large.
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Proposition 7 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, for sufficiently large number of
nodes, the efficiency of a bipartite Tura´n network is half of that of the efficient network in
the worst case and the network is close to being efficient in the best case.
Proof As µ is large, µ can be assumed to be even without loss of accuracy. The sum of
utilities of nodes in a bipartite Tura´n network with even number of nodes is approximately(µ
2
)2
2(b1 − c) + 2
(µ
2
2
)
2b2
From Lemma 2, star network is efficient in the range of c derived in Proposition 3. So, to
get the efficiency of the bipartite Tura´n network relative to the star network, we divide the
above expression by the sum of utilities of nodes in a star network, which is
2(µ− 1)(b1 − c) +
(
µ− 1
2
)
2b2 (7)
Using the assumption that µ is large and the fact from the derived sufficient conditions that
b2 is comparable to b1 − c, it can be shown that the efficiency relative to the star network,
approximately is 1
2
+ b1−c
2b2
. As the range of c in Proposition 3 depends on the value of γ,
the values of c are bounded by b1− b2 and b1− b3. So the efficiency is bounded by 1 on the
upper side and
(
1
2
+ b3
2b2
)
on the lower side, of that of the star network;
(
1
2
+ b3
2b2
)
can take
a minimum value of 1
2
when b3 << b2.
Proposition 8 Based on the derived sufficient conditions, for sufficiently large number of
nodes, the efficiency of a k-star network is 1
k
of that of the efficient network in the worst
case and the network is close to being efficient in the best case.
Proof As µ is large, in particular, µ >> k (not necessarily >> k2), µ can be assumed to
be divisible by k without loss of accuracy. The sum of utilities of nodes in such a k-star
network is approximately{(
k
2
)
+ (µ− k)
}
2(b1 − c) +
{
k(k − 1)
(
µ− k
k
)
+ k
(µ−k
k
2
)}
2b2 +
(
k
2
)(
µ− k
k
)2
2b3
From Lemma 2, star network is efficient in the range of c derived in Propositions 4 and 5.
So, to get the efficiency of the k-star network relative to the star network, we divide the
above expression by Expression (7). Using the assumption that µ is large and the fact from
the derived sufficient conditions that b2 and b3 are comparable to b1 − c, it can be shown
that the efficiency relative to the star network, approximately is 1
k
+
(
1− 1
k
)
b3
b2
. As b3 is
bounded by 0 and b2, the efficiency of k-star is bounded by
1
k
and 1 of that of the star
network.
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7 Deviation from the Derived Sufficient Conditions:
A Simulation Study
We have derived sufficient conditions under which various network topologies uniquely
emerge. In this section, we investigate the robustness of the derived sufficient conditions by
studying the deviation in network topology when there is a slight deviation in these suffi-
cient conditions. This problem is of practical interest since it may be difficult to maintain
the conditions on a network throughout its formation process.
We use the notion of graph edit distance (GED) [10] to measure the deviation in network
topology.
Definition 7 Given two graphs g and h having same number of nodes, the graph edit
distance between them is the minimum number of link additions and deletions required to
transform g into a graph that is isomorphic to h.
7.1 Computation of Graph Edit Distance
The problem of computing GED between two graphs is NP-hard, in general [35]. However,
we can exploit structural properties of certain graphs to compute GED between them and
other graphs, in polynomial time; we state three such results.
Theorem 1 The graph edit distance between a graph g and a star graph with same number
of nodes as g, is µ + ξ − 2∆ − 1, where µ and ξ are the number of nodes and edges in g,
respectively, and ∆ is the highest degree in g.
Proof While transforming g into a corresponding star graph, we need to map one node
of g to the center while the others to the leaf nodes. Let d be the degree of the node
which is mapped to the center. In order to transform g into a star graph, the node mapped
to the center must be connected to µ − 1 nodes. So the number of edges to be added is
(µ − 1) − d. Also all edges connecting any two nodes, that are mapped to the leaf nodes,
must be deleted, that is, all edges except the ones incident to the node mapped to the
center, must be removed. These account for ξ− d edges. Thus, total number of edges to be
added and deleted is µ+ ξ − 2d− 1. This is minimized when d = ∆.
Theorem 2 The graph edit distance between a graph g and a complete graph with same
number of nodes as g, is µ(µ−1)
2
− ξ, where µ and ξ are the number of nodes and edges in g,
respectively.
Proof Graph g can be transformed into the corresponding complete graph in minimum
number of steps by adding the edges which are absent.
Theorem 3 There exists an O(µk+2) polynomial time algorithm to compute the graph edit
distance between a graph g and a k-star graph with same number of nodes as g, where µ is
the number of nodes in g.
We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix F.
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7.2 Simulation Setup
In order to study the robustness of the derived sufficient conditions, we observed the effects
of deviation from these conditions, on the resulting networks, using GED as the measure of
topology deviation. We first observed the effect when the conditions were made to deviate
throughout the network formation process. The results were, however, uninteresting since
the deviation from the sufficient conditions for the formation of one topology, lead to the
formation of a completely different topology. A primary reason for such observations is that,
under the deviated conditions, some other networks are pairwise stable and these networks
have a very different topology than the desired one. In some cases, these deviated conditions
were sufficient conditions for other topologies, which were, however, not the desired ones.
In fact, it is unreasonable to assume that the conditions remain deviated throughout the
entire network formation process. It is possible that the conditions deviate at some point
of time, but the network owner will observe the resulting network under such deviations
and take necessary actions to rectify this problem. This lets us introduce the concept of
dynamic conditions on the network.
In simulations, we assume that the conditions deviate during the entry of a new node and
remain deviated throughout the evolution of the network until it reaches pairwise stability.
Once stability is reached, the network owner observes the deviation of the network from
the desired one, and takes actions to restore the original conditions. As it is undesirable for
the network to remain stagnant, any node which wants to enter the deviated network next,
is allowed to do so immediately, and the original conditions take effect during the entry of
such a node and evolution thereafter.
We observe how the topology deviates when the conditions deviate, and if, how, and
when the topology is restored, once the sufficient conditions are restored. We also observe
the values within the sufficient conditions which are more robust than others, that is, when
the conditions are restored to these values, the topology is restored at the earliest.
For simulations, we set the benefit parameters as per the symmetric connections model [21],
that is, we set bi = δ
i, where δ ∈ (0, 1); we set δ = 0.8 in our simulations. We consider three
types of values within the sufficient conditions, namely, {low(L), moderate(M), high(H)}
for each of the parameters c, c0 and γ (whenever applicable) and observe the combination
of their values which are the most robust to deviations. In our simulation study, low values
correspond to value around the lower 10% of the range in sufficient conditions, moderate to
around 50% mark, and high to around higher 10%. Also, for each combination, we run the
network formation process several times in order to account for the effects of randomization
in the order in which nodes take decisions.
Owing to sequential entry of nodes, there is an inherent ordering on nodes and they can
be numbered from 1 to the current number of nodes in the network, in the order in which they
enter. We call the node number at which the sufficient conditions deviate, as the deviation
node. The sufficient conditions are restored during the entry of the node immediately
following the deviation node. We say that the deviation from sufficient conditions on a
parameter is negative if the deviated value of the parameter is less than its lower bound in
the sufficient conditions, and positive if its deviated value is greater than its upper bound.
In our simulation study, the amount of deviation for each parameter was 2% of the length
of its range in sufficient conditions. The results observed for 5% and 10% deviations were
almost same. For parameters whose range in sufficient conditions is a singleton, the results
were studied for an absolute deviation of 0.01 on the scale where bi = 0.8
i.
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Figure 5: (a-b) Typical results of deviation from the derived sufficient conditions for devia-
tion node 7 (Y-axis gives the deviation when the network consists of number of nodes given
on X-axis)
7.3 Simulation Results
We observe the effects of deviation from the derived sufficient conditions for c and c0 on
the resulting network. The observations can be primarily classified into the following four
cases, in the decreasing order of desirability to network owner:
(A) The network does not deviate during the entry and also during the evolution after the
entry of deviation node.
(B) The network deviates after the entry of the deviation node, and perhaps remains
deviated during the entry and evolution for the entry of nodes following the deviation
node, but after a certain number of such node entries, the network regains its original
topology.
(C) The network deviates after the entry of the deviation node and remains deviated
during the entry and evolution for the entry of nodes following the deviation node;
the network does not regain its original topology, but the deviation is constant and so
a near-desired topology is obtained.
(D) The network deviates after the entry of the deviation node and the deviation increases
monotonically during the entry and evolution for the entry of nodes following the
deviation node.
Figures 5(a-b) give typical plots of the above four cases. The plots are split into two parts
for clarity. Result (A) is the most desirable but can be obtained only for some particular
deviation nodes depending on the topology for which the sufficient conditions are derived.
Result (B) is very common and this is the result the network owner should be looking at.
Result (C) is good from a practical viewpoint as the resulting network need not be exactly
the desired one, but it may still serve the purpose almost entirely. Result (D) is the one
that any network owner should avoid.
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Recall that c is the cost incurred by a node in order to maintain a link with each of its
immediate neighbors. So as c increases, the desirability of a node to form links decreases.
Also as discussed earlier, a higher value of network entry factor c0 lays the foundation for
formation of a more regular graph. In general, it plays an important role in dictating the
degree distribution of the resulting network. In what follows, we study the effects of all
valid deviations from sufficient conditions on cost parameters c and c0, on the resulting
network. In the tables that follow, if there were very few instances in which the network
did not deviate, we ignore them since such cases are remote when nodes take decisions in
some particular order. For observing deviations from k-star topology (k ≥ 3), the network
is assumed to start with the corresponding base graph consisting of 2k nodes as discussed
earlier.
Enlisted are the major findings of the simulations:
• Certain values of parameters within the derived sufficient conditions may be more
robust than others, that is, the value to which the conditions are restored during the
entry of the node immediately following the entry of the deviation node, may directly
affect the restoration of the topology.
• Network with certain number of nodes may be bottleneck for the range of sufficient
conditions (can be seen from the derivations of these conditions). In such cases, the
topology deviates only for discretely few deviation nodes, while it does not for others.
So the network owner may relax the conditions for most of the network formation
process.
• The sufficient conditions on c are more sensitive than those on c0, that is, the network
deviates more from the desired topology when the value of c deviates than when the
value of c0 deviates by similar margins.
• Results obtained owing to deviation from sufficient conditions during the entry of a
deviation node may be very different from that obtained owing to deviation during
the entry of some other deviation node.
• It may be possible to uniquely form some interesting topologies which may not be
feasible using any static sufficient conditions.
• In most scenarios, the order in which nodes take decisions plays an important role in
deciding the resulting topology. Deviations from sufficient conditions may cause large
deviations from the desired topology due to some ordering, while no deviation at all
due to some other.
The reader should note the difference in labels on the X and Y axes of the different plots
in this paper.
7.4 Results for Deviation with Respect to c
Negative deviation of c from sufficient conditions for star network:
These results are shown qualitatively in Table 1 and quantitatively in Figure 6(a). Fig-
ure 6(a) plots the deviation from network as observed for a network with 20 nodes, if the
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Figure 6: (a) Results of negative deviation of c from the sufficient conditions for star
topology when the network consists of 20 nodes and (b) A near-star network
γ = L γ = M γ = H
HHHHHHc0
c
L M H L M H L M H
L/M/H D C B D B B D C C
Table 1: Results of negative deviation of c for star network
conditions were deviated at a given deviation node. For deviation nodes 2 and 3, no devia-
tion in network was observed. For other deviation nodes, Table 1 shows the type of result
obtained owing to deviation from sufficient conditions on c at a deviation node, following
which, the values of γ, c0 and c are restored to one of {L,M,H}. The results are invariant
with respect to the restored value of c0. The table shows that γ = L coupled with c = H,
and γ = M coupled with c = M or H, give the best results, where the star topology is re-
stored as per result (B). γ = L coupled with c = M , and γ = H coupled with c = M or H,
give decent results for practical purposes, where a near-star network (Figure 6(b)) is ob-
tained as per result (C). c = L is unacceptable and should be avoided by network owner
desiring to form a star network, as these values are not robust to deviations from sufficient
conditions. Typical observations are shown in Figures 5(a-b).
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for star network:
No node enters the network at deviation node 2, while for all other deviation nodes, the
network does not deviate at all and so result (A) is obtained. The same is clear from the
derivation of sufficient conditions for star network, that entry of node 2 is the bottleneck
on the upper bound for c (c < b1). So node 2 stays out of the network until the sufficient
conditions are restored so that they are favorable for it to enter the network, and hence the
network builds up as desired. These results are desirable if the network owner is not too
concerned about the delay of node 2’s entry into the network.
24
2 4 6 8 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Deviation node
G
ED
 a
t d
ev
ia
tio
n 
no
de
 
 
Average
Maximum
Minimum
5 10 15 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
Node entry
G
ED
 
 
Star
Bipartite Turan
(a) (b)
Figure 7: (a) Results of positive deviation of c from the sufficient conditions for complete
network and (b) Comparison between result (D) for star network and bipartite Tura´n net-
work for deviation node 7 (Y-axis gives the deviation when the network consists of number
of nodes given on X-axis)
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for complete network:
No deviation in network was observed for deviation nodes 2 and 3. For other deviation
nodes, deviations in network were observed only during the entry of the deviation node
until the stabilization of the network henceforth (Figure 7(a)). Following this, the sufficient
conditions were restored and the network regained the desired topology, after the entry of
the node following the deviation node and the stabilization henceforth (result (B)), since
the condition c < b1 − b2 ensures that the network so formed has diameter at most 1
(Proposition 2), and this is irrespective of the preceding network states.
Negative deviation of c from sufficient conditions for bipartite Tura´n network:
The desired network was obtained for all deviation nodes except 4, as clear from the deriva-
tion of sufficient conditions (the 4-node network is the bottleneck for the lower bound on c).
For deviation node 4, GED between the resulting network of 4 nodes and the corresponding
bipartite Tura´n network was 3. The topology was restored from the entry of the following
node onwards in most instances, while it took up to 9 node entries for some.
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for bipartite Tura´n network:
No deviation in network was observed for deviation nodes 2 to 5. However, deviation node 6
onwards, result (D) was observed regularly for all combinations of values {L,M,H} assigned
to γ, c0 and c, apart from when nodes take decisions in a particular order (in which case,
no deviation was observed). For each deviation node 6 onwards, the average GED when the
network reached the size of 20 nodes was around 50 and was increasing rapidly as shown in
Figure 7(b). This GED is expected to be more than that in the case of star network, owing
to its relatively high edge density. Such deviations from the desired network were observed
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even for extremely minor deviations of c from the derived sufficient conditions. So restoring
the sufficient conditions is not a viable solution for this case. The network owner should
ensure that the values of c are on the lower side so as to stay away from the upper bound.
Negative deviation of c from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
GED for all deviation nodes were strictly positive and monotonically increasing, qualita-
tively looking like result (D) in Figure 5(a).
Positive deviation of c from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
Result (A) was observed for all deviation nodes except 2k through 3k−1. The reason for the
deviation in network for these deviation nodes is that, in the k-star network consisting of
number of nodes between 2k and 3k−1, both inclusive, there exists at least one center with
only one leaf node linked to it. When there is a positive deviation of c from the sufficient
conditions for k-star network, it is beneficial for any other center to delete link with a center
that is linked to only one leaf node, and this link deletion leads to other link alterations
among other nodes, thus deviating the network from the desired topology. For deviation
nodes 2k through 3k − 1, result (D) was observed consistently, which qualitatively looked
like the one in Figure 5(a).
7.5 Results for Deviation with Respect to c0
Positive deviation of c0 from sufficient conditions for star network:
These results are shown qualitatively in Table 2 and quantitatively in Figure 8(a). The graph
in Figure 8(a) plots the deviation from network as observed when the network reached the
size of 20 nodes, if the conditions were deviated at a given deviation node. For deviation
nodes 2 and 3, no deviation in network was observed. For other deviation nodes, Table 2
shows the type of result obtained owing to deviation from sufficient conditions on c0 at a
deviation node, following which, the values of γ, c0 and c are restored to one of {L,M,H}.
When the sufficient conditions are restored to low values of c after deviating from the
sufficient conditions, the resulting network is a (2, n− 2)-complete bipartite network (result
(D)) similar to that in Figure 8(b), where node Y was the original center and the conditions
were deviated during entry of node X.
γ = L γ = M γ = H
HHHHHHc0
c
L M H L M H L M H
L/M/H D B B D B B D C C
Table 2: Results of positive deviation of c0 for star network
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Figure 8: (a) Results of positive deviation of c0 from the sufficient conditions for star
network when the network consists of 20 nodes and (b) A (2, 8)-complete bipartite network
Positive deviation of c0 from sufficient conditions for complete and bipartite
Tura´n networks:
No deviation was observed for early deviation nodes, that is, if the conditions were deviated
when the network consisted of less number of nodes. Let dT be the degree of the node to
which a new node desires to connect in order to enter the network. For both complete and
bipartite Tura´n networks, beyond a certain limit on the number of nodes, the minimum
value of dT is very high. So during positive deviation of c0, the term dT ((1 − γ)b2 − c0)
becomes extremely negative, overpowering other benefits, thus making it undesirable for
a new node to enter the network. A new node enters once the sufficient conditions are
restored. These results are desirable if the network owner is not concerned about the delay
of node entry.
Negative deviation of c0 from sufficient conditions for bipartite Tura´n network:
The desired network was obtained for all odd numbered deviation nodes and deviation
node 2. For deviation node 4, GED between the resulting network of 4 nodes and the
corresponding bipartite Tura´n network was 3. For most instances, the topology was restored
from the entry of the following node onwards; but some instances took up to 9 node entries
to settle back to a bipartite Tura´n network (very similar to the case of negative deviation
of c). For every even-numbered deviation node n ≥ 4, deviations in network were observed
only during the entry of the deviation node until the stabilization of the network henceforth,
with GED = n− 1. Following this, the sufficient conditions were restored and the network
regained the desired topology, after the entry of the node following the deviation node and
the stabilization henceforth. Figure 9(a) shows the result when node X tries to enter the
bipartite Tura´n network consisting of nodes A,B,C,D,E, as the 6th node, during negative
deviation of c0. It creates links with nodes B,D instead of A,C,E, thus giving graph edit
distance of 5. Following this, the sufficient conditions are restored and the following node
X + 1 forms links with low degree nodes, forming a bipartite Tura´n network of 7 nodes,
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Figure 9: Restorations of (a) bipartite Tura´n and (b) 3-star network topologies
thus restoring the topology.
Negative deviation of c0 from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
For deviation node n such that (n mod k) = 1, the network did not deviate and so result
(A) was observed. For all other deviation nodes, result (B) was observed. In general,
for deviation node n, GED was observed to be 2, and it took [(k + 1− z) mod k] node
entries for the topology to be restored once the sufficient conditions were restored, where
z = (n mod k). Figure 9(b) shows the result when node X tries to enter the 3-star network
consisting of nodes A through J , as the 11th node, during negative deviation of c0. It creates
a link with node A instead of either B or C, thus giving GED of 2. Following this, the
sufficient conditions are restored and so the following node X + 1 forms links with a lowest
degree center, say C; but GED remains 2. Then the next node X + 2 tries to enter, which
forms a link with the only lowest degree center B, forming a 3-star network of 13 nodes,
thus restoring the topology. In this example, k = 3 and n = 11 and so it takes 2 node
entries for the topology to be restored.
Positive deviation of c0 from sufficient conditions for k-star network:
Let C be a center with the lowest degree and mj be the number of leaf nodes already
connected to center j. It can be shown that result (A) will be obtained if the positive
deviation of c0 is less that the threshold:
(b3 − b4)
(∑
j 6=Cmj + In6=pk+1
k +mC − 2 − 1
)
where n is the deviation node, and In6=pk+1 is 1 if n 6= pk + 1 for any integer p, else it is 0.
If the deviation crossed this threshold in simulations, result (D) was observed consistently,
which qualitatively looked like the one in Figure 5(a). The result is owing to the fact that a
high value of c0 would force a new node to prefer connecting to a leaf node which is linked
to a center with the highest degree, rather than any center directly; this leads to other link
alterations among other nodes, thus deviating the network from the desired topology.
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8 Conclusion
We proposed a model of recursive network formation where nodes enter a network sequen-
tially, thus triggering evolution each time a new node enters. We considered a sequential
move game model with myopic nodes under a very general utility model, and pairwise sta-
bility as the equilibrium notion; however the proposed model (Figure 2) is independent of
the network evolution model, the equilibrium notion, as well as the utility model. The
recursive nature of our model enabled us to analyze the network formation process using an
elegant induction-based technique. For each of the relevant topologies, by directing network
evolution as desired, we derived sufficient conditions under which that topology uniquely
emerges. The derived conditions suggest that conditions on network entry impact degree
distribution, while conditions on link costs impact density; also there arise constraints on
intermediary rents owing to contrasting densities of connections in the desired topology.
We then analyzed the social welfare properties of the considered topologies, and studied the
effects of deviating from the derived conditions.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 For a network, if c < b1 − bd+1 (d ≥ 1) and c0 ≤ (1 − γ)b2, the resulting
diameter is at most d.
Proof The conditions c < b1 and c0 ≤ (1 − γ)b2 ensure that any new node successfully
enters the network, that is, it gets a positive utility by doing so, and the node to which it
connects to in order to enter the network, also gets a higher utility.
Now consider a network where c < b1 − bd+1 and there exist two nodes, say A and B,
which are at a distance x > d from each other. The indirect benefit they get from each other
is bx ≤ bd+1. In the case where there exist essential nodes connecting these nodes, each has
to pay an additional rent of γbx. By establishing a connection between them, each node
gets an additional direct benefit of b1 and incurs an additional cost c. Also this connection
may decrease the distances between either of these nodes and other nodes, for instance,
direct neighbors of node B which were at distance bx−1, bx or bx+1 from node A, are now at
distance min{b2, bx−1}, resulting in increase in indirect benefits for node A.
It can be easily seen that if either (or both) of these nodes acted as an essential node for
some pair of nodes, it remains to do so even after the connection is established. Furthermore,
it is possible that the established connection shortens the path between this pair, resulting
in higher bridging benefits for the node under consideration.
Summing up, by establishing a mutual connection between nodes which are at distance
x > d from each other, the overall increase in utility for either node is at least b1− c and the
overall decrease is at most bd+1. So the condition sufficient for link creation is b1− c > bd+1.
As this is true for any such pair, without loss of generality, the network will evolve until
distance between any pair is at most d.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 For a network with γ < b2−b3
3b2−b3 , if b1 − b2 + γ (3b2 − b3) < c < b1 − b3 and
(1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 ≤ (1− γ) b2, the unique resulting topology is a bipartite Tura´n graph.
Proof We first derive conditions for ensuring pairwise stability of a bipartite Tura´n net-
work, that is, assuming that such a network is formed, what conditions are required so that
there are no incentives for any two unconnected nodes to create a link between them and
for any node to delete any of its links. Note that these conditions can be integrated in the
later part of the proof within different scenarios that we consider.
In what follows, p1 is the size of the partition constituting the node taking its decision, p2
is the size of the other partition and n = p1 + p2 is the number of nodes in the network.
We need to consider cases for some discretely small number of nodes owing to the nature
of essential nodes, after which, the analysis holds for arbitrarily large number of nodes.
For brevity, we present the analysis for the base case and a generic case in each scenario,
omitting presentation of discrete cases.
32
No two nodes belonging to the same partition should create a link between
them: Their utility should not increase by doing so. This is not applicable for n = 2.
For n = 3,
2(b1 − c) ≤ b1 − c+ (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 (B.1)
For n ≥ 4,
(p2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (p1 − 2)b2 ≤ p2(b1 − c) + (p1 − 1)b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2
which is a weaker condition that Inequality (B.1).
No node should delete its link with any node belonging to the other partition:
That is, their utility should not increase by doing so.
For n = 2,
0 ≤ b1 − c
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 (B.2)
For n ≥ 6,
(p2 − 1)(b1 − c) + (p1 − 1)b2 + b3 ≤ p2(b1 − c) + (p1 − 1)b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3 (B.3)
It can be shown that conditions for the discrete cases n = 3, 4, 5 are satisfied by Inequal-
ity (B.3).
In the process of formation of a bipartite Tura´n network, at most four different types of
nodes exist at any point in time.
I newly entered node
II nodes connected to the newly entered node
III nodes in the same partition as Type II nodes, but not connected to newly entered node
IV rest of the nodes
The notation we use while deriving the sufficient conditions are as follows:
k number of nodes of Type II
n number of nodes in network, including new node
m1 number of nodes of Types II and III put together
m2 number of nodes of Type IV
For the newly entering node to enter the network: Its utility should be positive after
doing so. Also, in case of even n, for the new node to be a part of the smaller partition, its
first connection should be a node belonging to the larger partition. So for k = 0, we have
For n ≥ 2,
b1 − c+ dn
2
− 1e ((1− γ)b2 − c0) + bn
2
− 1c(1− γ)b3 > 0
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It can be seen that the condition is the strongest when n = 2 whenever
c0 ≤ (1− γ)b2 (B.4)
The condition thus becomes
c < b1
which is satisfied by Inequality (B.3).
The utility of a node in the larger partition, whenever applicable, should not
decrease after accepting link from the new node:
For n = 2,
b1 − c ≥ 0
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1
For n ≥ 5,
dn
2
e(b1 − c) + bn
2
− 1cb2 + γdn
2
− 1e2b2 + γbn
2
− 1c2b3
≥ dn
2
− 1e(b1 − c) + bn
2
− 1cb2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 + 2γdn
2
− 1eb2 + bn
2
− 1cb3
The conditions for these as well as the discrete cases n = 3, 4 are satisfied by Inequality (B.3).
The new node should connect to a node in the larger partition, whenever appli-
cable: One way to see this is by ensuring that this strategy strictly dominates connecting
to a node in the smaller partition. This scenario arises for even values of n ≥ 4.
b1 − c+
(n
2
− 1
)
((1− γ)b2 − c0) +
(n
2
− 1
)
(1− γ)b3
> b1 − c+
(n
2
)
((1− γ)b2 − c0) +
(n
2
− 2
)
(1− γ)b3
⇐⇒ c0 > (1− γ)(b2 − b3) (B.5)
An alternative condition would be such that the utility of a node in the smaller partition
decreases if it accepts the link from the new node, thus forcing the latter to connect to
a node in the other partition. But it can be seen that this condition is inconsistent with
Inequality (B.3) and so we use Inequality (B.5) to meet our purpose.
Type I node should prefer connecting to a Type III node, if any, than remaining
in its current state: For k ≥ 2, this scenario does not arise for n < 6. For n ≥ 6,
(k + 1)(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − k − 1)b3 > k(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − k)b3
⇐⇒ c < b1 − b3 (B.6)
Now for k = 1, this scenario does not arise for n = 2, 3.
For n ≥ 4,
2(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − 2)b3 > b1 − c+ (1− γ)m2b2 + (1− γ)(m1 − 1)b3
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⇐⇒ c < b1 − b3 + γ(m2b2 + (m1 − 1)b3)
Note that as n ≥ 4, we have m1 ≥ 2 and m2 ≥ 1 and so the above condition is weaker that
Inequality (B.6).
It is also necessary that utility of Type III node does not decrease on accepting link from
Type I node. In fact, when the former gets a chance to move, we derive conditions so that
it also volunteers to create a link with the later.
The utility of Type III node should increase if it successfully creates a link with
Type I node: When k = 1, the case does not arise for n = 2, 3.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > m2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b3
⇐⇒ c < b1 − b3 + γb3
The conditions obtained from discrete cases n = 4, 5 are weaker than this one.
For k ≥ 2, this case does not arise for n < 6.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > m2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + b3
⇐⇒ c < b1 − b3
The conditions for all cases are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type III node should not delete its link with Type IV node: This can be assured if
this strategy is dominated by its strategy of forming a link with Type I node. This scenario
does not arise for n = 2, 3. The conditions for the discrete cases n = 4, 5, 6 are weaker than
that for n ≥ 7.
For n ≥ 7,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 − 1)(b1 − c) + b3 + (m1 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b3
⇐⇒ c < b1 − b3 + γ
2
b3
For k ≥ 2, the cases applicable are n ≥ 6. The condition for discrete case n = 6 is weaker
than the following condition.
For n ≥ 7,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 − 1)(b1 − c) + b3 + b3 + (m1 − 1)b2
⇐⇒ c < b1 − b3
Hence, all conditions for this scenario are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type III node should prefer connecting to Type I node than to another Type
III node: This does not arise for n < 6. When k = 1,
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + (1− γ)b3
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⇐⇒ b2 > (1− γ)b3
which is always true. For k ≥ 2,
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 > (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + b3
⇐⇒ b2 > b3
which is always true.
Type IV node should not delete its link with Type III node: That is, its utility
should not increase by doing so. This does not arise for n < 4.
For n ≥ 7,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2 + b3
≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3
The conditions for discrete cases n = 4, 5, 6 are weaker than the above condition. For k ≥ 2,
the new cases are n ≥ 6, where the discrete case n = 6 result in conditions weaker than the
following one.
For n ≥ 7,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2 + b3 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3
It can be seen that all conditions of this scenario are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type IV node should also not break its link with Type II node: That is, its utility
should not increase by doing so. For k = 1,
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b4 + (1− γ)b3
≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3 + (1− γ)(b2 − b4) + γb3
The discrete cases n = 3, 4, 5 result in weaker conditions than this. For k ≥ 2,
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 − 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2 + b3 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3
The conditions are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Type I node should not propose a link to a Type IV node: One way is to ensure
that this strategy of Type I node is dominated by its strategy to propose a link to a Type
III node. It can be seen that for k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, this translates to
(k + 1)(b1 − c) +m2b2 + (m1 − k − 1)b3
> (k + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (m1 − k)b2
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⇐⇒ b2 − b3 > (m1 − k)(b2 − b3)
which is not true for m1 > k.
So we look at the alternative condition that the utility of Type IV node decreases if it
accepts the link from Type I node, and as Type I node computes this decrease in utility, it
will not propose a link to Type IV node. First, we consider k = 1. The discrete case n = 4
gives the following condition.
3(b1 − c) + 2γb2 + 2γb2 < 2(b1 − c) + (1− γ)b2 + 2γb2 + γb3
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2 + γ(3b2 − b3) (B.7)
The other discrete cases n = 3, 5 result in weaker conditions than the above.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 < m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2 + γb2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (B.7). Now for k ≥ 2, n = 4, 5 correspond to
pairwise stability conditions and cases n < 4 are not applicable.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 < m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2
which is satisfied by Inequality (B.7).
Type IV node should not propose a link to Type I node: This scenario is essentially
equivalent to the previous one scenario of utility of Type IV node decreasing due to link
with Type I node, with the equalities permitted. So these result in weaker and hence no
additional conditions.
Type III node should not propose a link to Type II node: One way is to ensure
that for Type III node, connecting to Type II node is strictly dominated by connecting to
Type I node. It can be seen that for k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 6, this translates to
(m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + b2 < (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
which gives 0 > 0. So we need to use the alternative condition that the utility of Type II
node decreases on accepting link from Type III node. For k = 1,
For n = 4,
3(b1 − c) + 4γb2 < 2(b1 − c) + (1− γ)b2 + 2γb2 + γb3
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2 + γ(3b2 − b3)
which is same as Inequality (B.7).
For n ≥ 5,
(m2 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 + 2γ(m2 + 1)b2 + 2γ(m1 − 2)b3
< (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + 2γm2b2 + 2γ(m1 − 1)b3
37
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2 + 2γ(b2 − b3)
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (B.7). Now for k ≥ 2, the only new case is the
following.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 < (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2
which is satisfied by Inequality (B.7).
Type II node should not propose a link with Type III node: This is essentially
equivalent to the above scenario of utility of Type II node decreasing due to link with Type
III node, with the equalities permitted. So these result in weaker and hence no additional
conditions.
No Type II node should delete link with Type IV node: First, we consider k = 1.
For n ≥ 7,
m2(b1 − c) + (b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + 2γm2b2 + 2γ(m1 − 1)b3
≥ (m2 − 1)(b1 − c) + (b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + b3 + 2γ(m2 − 1)b2 + 2γ(m1 − 1)b3 + 2γb4
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3 + 2γ(b2 − b4)
This as well as all discrete cases n < 7 are satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
For k ≥ 2, the cases of n = 4, 5 correspond to pairwise stability condition that we have
already considered, while cases n < 4 are not applicable.
For n ≥ 6,
m2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2 + b3 ≤ (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3
which is satisfied by Inequality (B.6).
Two Type IV nodes should not create a mutual link: That is their utilities should
not increase by doing so. When k = 1, it is not applicable for n < 5. Also, the discrete case
n = 5 results in the same condition as below.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 2)b2 + (1− γ)b2
≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2
For k ≥ 2, n = 5 corresponds to pairwise stability condition.
For n ≥ 6,
(m1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 2)b2 + b2 ≤ m1(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)b2 + b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2
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These are weaker conditions than Inequality (B.7).
No two Type II nodes should create a link between themselves: This only applies
to k ≥ 2. Also n = 4, 5 result in pairwise stability condition.
For n ≥ 6,
(m2 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 2)b2 ≤ (m2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (B.7).
Link between Type I node and Type II node should not be deleted: It is clear
that it will not be deleted as such a link is just formed with no other changes in the network.
Inequalities (B.6) and (B.7) are stronger conditions than Inequalities (B.1), (B.2) and
(B.3). Furthermore, for non-zero range of c, from Inequalities (B.6) and (B.7), we have
γ <
b2 − b3
3b2 − b3 (B.8)
The required sufficient conditions are obtained by combining Inequalities (B.4), (B.5), (B.6),
(B.7) and (B.8).
C Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 Let σ be the upper bound on the number of nodes that can enter the network
and λ = dσ
2
− 1e (2b2 − b3). Then, if (1− γ) (b2 − b3) < c0 < (1− γ) (b2 − b4) and either
(i) γ < min
{
b2−b3
λ−b3 ,
b3
b2+b3
}
and b1 − b3 + γ(b2 + b3) ≤ c < b1, or
(ii) b2−b3
λ−b3 ≤ γ < min
{
b2
λ+b2
, b3
b2+b3
}
and b1 − b2 + γb2 + γλ ≤ c < b1,
the unique resulting topology is a 2-star.
Proof We derive sufficient conditions for the formation of a 2-star network by forming its
skeleton of four nodes first, that is, a network with two interconnected centers, connected
to one leaf node each. Once this is formed, we ensure that a newly entering node connects
to the center with fewer number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, so as to maintain the
load balance between the two centers.
Forming the skeleton of the 2-star network: With one node in the network, the second
node should successfully create a link with the former. The condition for ensuring this is
c < b1 (C.1)
For the third node to enter, it should propose a link to any of the two existing nodes in the
network, that is, it should get a positive utility by doing so. This gives
c < b1 + (1− γ)b2 − c0
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This is ensured by Inequality (C.1) and
c0 ≤ (1− γ)b2 (C.2)
Also the existing node to which the link is proposed, should accept it, that is, its utility
should not decrease by doing so.
2(b1 − c) + 2γb2 ≥ b1 − c
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 + 2γb2
which is a weaker condition than Inequality (C.1). We have to also ensure that this V-
shaped network of three nodes is pairwise stable. It is clear that no node will delete any
of its links since such a link is just formed. However, we have to ensure that the two leaf
nodes of this V-shaped network do not create a mutual link. This can be ensured by
2(b1 − c) ≤ b1 − c+ (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 (C.3)
Following this, the fourth node should propose a link to one of the two leaf node in the
V-shaped network. For ensuring that its utility increases by doing so,
c < b1 + (1− γ)b2 − c0 + (1− γ)b3
which is satisfied by Inequalities (C.1) and (C.2). Also, it should prefer connecting to a leaf
node than the center of the V-shaped network, that is,
b1 − c+ (1− γ)b2 − c0 + (1− γ)b3 > b1 − c+ 2(1− γ)b2 − 2c0
⇐⇒ c0 > (1− γ)(b2 − b3) (C.4)
The leaf node to which the link is proposed, should accept the link.
2(b1 − c) + (1− γ)b2 + 2γb2 + γb3 ≥ b1 − c+ (1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 + γ(2b2 + b3)
which is satisfied by Inequality (C.1).
We have to also ensure that this network is pairwise stable. We derive sufficient conditions
for pairwise stability of a general 2-star network with number of nodes n ≥ 4, which includes
the sufficient conditions for pairwise stability of the skeleton thus formed.
Let the centers of the 2-star be labeled C1 and C2. Also, let the number of leaf nodes
connected to C1 be m1 and that connected to C2 be m2.
Leaf nodes that are connected to different centers, should not create a mutual
link: This scenario is valid for n ≥ 4. Without loss of generality, for a leaf node connected
to C1,
2(b1 − c) + (m1 − 1)(1− γ)b2 + b2 + (m2 − 1)(1− γ)b3
≤ b1 − c+m1(1− γ)b2 +m2(1− γ)b3
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⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b3 + γ(b2 + b3) (C.5)
Link between one center and a leaf node of the other center should not be
created: One option to ensure this is to see that the utility of center C1 decreases owing
to its link with a leaf node of C2. This is valid for n ≥ 4.
(m1 + 2)(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)(1− γ)b2 + γ(2)(m1)2b2 + γ
2
(m1)(m2 − 1)2b3
< (m1 + 1)(b1 − c) +m2(1− γ)b2 + γ(1)(m1)2b2 + γ
2
(m1)(m2)2b3
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2 + γb2 + γm1(2b2 − b3)
As it needs to be true for all n ≥ 4, we set the condition to
c > max
n≥4
{
b1 − b2 + γb2 + γm1(2b2 − b3)
}
Since max{m1} = dσ2 − 1e, where σ is the upper bound on the number of nodes that can
enter the network,
c > b1 − b2 + γb2 + γdσ
2
− 1e(2b2 − b3) (C.6)
An alternative option to the above condition is to ensure that the utility of leaf node
connected to C2 decreases when it establishes a link with C1.
2(b1 − c) + (m2 − 1)(1− γ)b2 +m1(1− γ)b2
< b1 − c+m2(1− γ)b2 +m1(1− γ)b3
⇐⇒ c > b1 − (1− γ)b2 +m1(1− γ)(b2 − b3)
As it needs to be true for all n ≥ 4 and max{m1} = dσ2 − 1e, we set the condition to
c > b1 − (1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)dσ
2
− 1e(b2 − b3) (C.7)
No link is broken in the 2-star network: It is easy to check that, as 2-star is a tree
graph, the condition c < b1 in Inequality (C.1) is sufficient to ensure this.
Two leaf nodes of a center should not create a mutual link: This case arises for
n ≥ 5. It can be easily checked that the condition c ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 in Inequality (C.3) is
sufficient to ensure this.
This completes the sufficient conditions for pairwise stability of a 2-star network. In
what follows, we ensure that any new node successfully enters an existing 2-star network
such that the topology is maintained.
A newly entering node should prefer connecting to the center with less number
of leaf nodes, whenever applicable: This case arises when n is even and n ≥ 6, that is,
when a new node tries to enter a 2-star network with odd number of nodes. Without loss
of generality, let m1 = m2 + 1. So the new node should prefer connecting to C2 over C1.
b1 − c+ (m2 + 1)((1− γ)b2 − c0) +m1(1− γ)b3
> b1 − c+ (m1 + 1)((1− γ)b2 − c0) +m2(1− γ)b3
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⇐⇒ c0 > (1− γ)(b2 − b3)
which is same as Inequality (C.4).
The new node should not stay out of the network: Its utility should be positive when
it enters the network by connecting to the center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever
applicable.
b1 − c+ (m2 + 1)((1− γ)b2 − c0) +m1(1− γ)b3 > 0
It can be easily seen that, as m1,m2 ≥ 1, the above is always true when Inequalities (C.1)
and (C.4) are satisfied.
The center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, should accept
the link from the newly entering node: The condition c < b1 in Inequality (C.1) is
sufficient to ensure this.
The newly entering node should prefer connecting to the center with less number
of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, over connecting to any leaf node: It is easy
to see that, as b3 > b4, whenever the number of leaf nodes connected to the centers are
different, a newly entering node prefers connecting to a leaf node connected to C1 over
that connected to C2 (assuming m1 = m2 + 1). Hence we have to ensure that connecting
to the center with less number of leaf nodes, whenever applicable, is more beneficial to a
newly entering node than connecting to a leaf node that is connected to C1. Without loss
of generality, we want the new node to prefer connecting to C2 (irrespective of whether
m1 = m2 or m1 = m2 + 1).
b1 − c+ (m2 + 1)((1− γ)b2 − c0) +m1(1− γ)b3
> b1 − c+ (1− γ)b2 − c0 +m1(1− γ)b3 +m2(1− γ)b4
⇐⇒ m2(1− γ)b2 −m2c0 > m2(1− γ)b4
As m2 ≥ 1,
c0 < (1− γ)(b2 − b4) (C.8)
The conditions on c can be obtained from Inequalities (C.1), (C.3), (C.5), and either
(C.6) or (C.7). Suppose we choose Inequality (C.7) over Inequality (C.6). So, for c to have
a non-empty range of values, from Inequalities (C.1) and (C.7), we must have
b1 − (1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)dσ
2
− 1e(b2 − b3) < b1
As γ < 1, the above is equivalent to
b2 > dσ
2
− 1e(b2 − b3)
which is not true for arbitrarily large values of σ. So we cannot use Inequality (C.7).
Suppose we choose Inequality (C.6). So, for c to have a non-empty range of values, from
Inequalities (C.1) and (C.6), we must have
b1 − b2 + γb2 + γdσ
2
− 1e(2b2 − b3) < b1
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Let λ = dσ
2
− 1e(2b2 − b3). So the above is equivalent to
γ <
b2
λ+ b2
(C.9)
which is a valid range of γ as γ ∈ [0, 1). So we use Inequality (C.6) instead of Inequal-
ity (C.7). Also, Inequality (C.3) is weaker than Inequality (C.6). For c to have a non-empty
range of values, it is also necessary, from Inequalities (C.1) and (C.5), that
b1 − b3 + γ(b2 + b3) < b1
⇐⇒ γ < b3
b2 + b3
(C.10)
Both Inequalities (C.5) and (C.6) lower bound c. So we need to determine the stronger con-
dition of the two. It can be seen that Inequality (C.5) is at least as strong as Inequality (C.6)
if and only if
b1 − b3 + γ(b2 + b3) ≥ b1 − b2 + γb2 + γλ
⇐⇒ γ ≤ b2 − b3
λ− b3 (C.11)
We consider the cases when either is a stronger condition.
Case (i) If Inequality (C.11) is true:
Inequalities (C.1) and (C.5) are the strongest conditions. So the sufficient condition on c is
b1 − b3 + γ(b2 + b3) ≤ c < b1 (C.12)
and Inequalities (C.9), (C.10) and (C.11) give
γ < min
{b2 − b3
λ− b3 ,
b2
λ+ b2
,
b3
b2 + b3
}
It can also be shown that for λb3 ≥ b22, min
{
b2−b3
λ−b3 ,
b2
λ+b2
, b3
b2+b3
}
= b2−b3
λ−b3
and for λb3 ≤ b22, min
{
b2−b3
λ−b3 ,
b2
λ+b2
, b3
b2+b3
}
= b3
b2+b3
. So the above reduces to
γ < min
{b2 − b3
λ− b3 ,
b3
b2 + b3
}
(C.13)
Case (ii) If Inequality (C.11) is not true:
Inequalities (C.1) and (C.6) are the strongest conditions. So the sufficient condition on c is
b1 − b2 + γb2 + γλ ≤ c < b1 (C.14)
and Inequalities (C.9), (C.10) and the reverse of (C.11) give
b2 − b3
λ− b3 ≤ γ < min
{ b2
λ+ b2
,
b3
b2 + b3
}
(C.15)
Furthermore, Inequalities (C.2), (C.4) and (C.8) give the sufficient conditions on c0.
(1− γ)(b2 − b3) < c0 < (1− γ)(b2 − b4) (C.16)
Inequalities (C.12), (C.13) and (C.16) give the sufficient conditions (i) in the proposition,
while Inequalities (C.14), (C.15) and (C.16) give the sufficient conditions (ii).
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D Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 Under the proposed utility model, for the entire family of k-star networks (given
some k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b1 − b3.
Proof We consider two scenarios sufficient to prove this.
I) No center should delete its link with any other center: Here, only one case is
enough to be considered, that is, when each center has just one leaf node, since in all other
cases, the benefits obtained by each center from the connection with other centers is at least
as much. For k = 3,
3(b1 − c) + 2(1− γ)b2 + γ(1)(2)2b2 + γ
2
(1)(2)b3
≥ 2(b1 − c) + 2(1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)b3 + γ(1)(1)2b2 + 2
(γ
2
(1)(1)2b3
)
+
γ
3
(1)(1)2b4
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3 + γ(2b2 + b3)− 2γ
3
b4 (D.1)
For k ≥ 4,
(k − 1 + 1)(b1 − c) + (k − 1)(1− γ)b2 + γ(1)(k − 1)2b2 + γ
2
(1)(k − 1)2b3
≥ (k − 2 + 1)(b1 − c) + (k − 2)(1− γ)b2 + b2 + (1− γ)b3
+ γ(1)(k − 2)2b2 + γ
2
(1)(k − 2)2b3 + γ(1)(1)2b3 + γ
2
(1)(1)2b4
⇐⇒ c ≤ b1 − b3 + γ(b2 − b4) (D.2)
II) Leaf nodes of different centers should not form a link with each other: Consider
a leaf node. Let mi be the number of leaf nodes connected to the center to which the leaf
node under consideration, is connected. For k ≥ 3,
2(b1 − c) + (mi − 1)(1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)b3(
∑
j 6=i
mi − 1) + (k − 1)b2
≤ b1 − c+ (mi − 1)(1− γ)b2 + (1− γ)b3
∑
j 6=i
mi + (k − 1)(1− γ)b2
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b3 + γ((k − 1)b2 + b3) (D.3)
The only way to satisfy Inequalities (D.1), (D.2) and (D.3) simultaneously is by setting
γ = 0 (D.4)
and
c = b1 − b3 (D.5)
thus proving the lemma.
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E Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 For a network starting with the base graph for k-star (given some k ≥ 3),
and γ = 0, if c = b1− b3 and b2− b3 < c0 < b2− b4, the unique resulting topology is a k-star.
Proof It is clear from Lemma 1 that under the proposed utility model, for the family of
k-star networks (k ≥ 3) to be pairwise stable, it is necessary that γ = 0 and c = b1 − b3 in
order to stabilize all possible k-star networks for a given k, and hence forms the necessary
part of sufficient conditions for the formation of a k-star network. Hence, for the rest of this
proof, we will assume that
γ = 0 (E.1)
and
c = b1 − b3 (E.2)
Without loss of generality, assume some indexing over the k centers from 1 to k. Let Ci be
the center with index i and mi be the number of leaf nodes it is linked to. Also we start with
a base graph in which every center is linked to one leaf node and the number of leaf nodes
linked to each center increases as the process goes on. So we have, mi ≥ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
For the newly entering node to propose entering the network: Our objective is
to ensure that the newly entering node connects to a center with the least number of leaf
nodes, in order to maintain balance over the number of leaf nodes linked to the centers.
Without loss of generality, assume that we want the newly entering node to connect to C1.
The utility of the newly entering node should be positive after doing so.
b1 − c+ (m1 + k − 1) (b2 − c0) + b3
k∑
i=2
mi > 0
Since the minimum value of mi is 1 for any i, the above condition is true if
c < b1 + k (b2 − c0) + (k − 1)b3
This is satisfied by Equation (E.2) and
c0 < b2 + b3 (E.3)
The newly entering node should connect to a center with the least number of
leaf nodes, whenever applicable: This case does not arise when all centers have the
same number of leaf nodes. Moreover, the way we direct the evolution of the network, the
number of leaf nodes connected to any two centers differs by at most one. Without loss
of generality, assume that we want the newly entering node to connect to C1. Consider a
center Cp such that mp = m1 + 1. So the newly entering node should prefer connecting to
C1 over connecting to Cp.
b1 − c+ (m1 + k − 1) (b2 − c0) + b3
k∑
i=2
mi
> b1 − c+ (mp + k − 1) (b2 − c0) + b3
∑
1≤i≤k
i 6=p
mi
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As mp = m1 + 1, we have
c0 > b2 − b3 (E.4)
For a center with the least number of leaf nodes to accept the link from the
newly entering node: It can be easily seen that this is ensured by Equation (E.2).
The newly entering node should not connect to any leaf node: It can be easily seen
that owing to benefits degrading with distance, for the newly entering node, connecting to
any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number of leaf nodes, strictly
dominates connecting to any other leaf node, whenever applicable. So it is sufficient to
ensure that the newly entering node does not connect to any leaf node which is connected
to a center with the most number of leaf nodes. This can be done by ensuring that for
the newly entering node, connecting to a center with the least number of leaf nodes strictly
dominates connecting to any leaf node which is connected to a center with the most number
of leaf nodes. Say we want the newly entering node to prefer connecting to center C1 over
a leaf node that is linked to center Cp.
b1 − c+ (m1 + k − 1)(b2 − c0) + b3
k∑
i=2
mi
> b1 − c+ b2 − c0 + (mp + k − 2)b3 + b4
∑
1≤i≤k
i 6=p
mi
We need to consider two cases (i) mp = m1 + 1 and (ii) mp = m1
Case (i) mp = m1 + 1: Substituting this value of mp gives
(m1 + k − 1)(b2 − c0) + (b3 − b4)
∑
2≤i≤k
i 6=p
mi +m1(b3 − b4)
+b3 > b2 − c0 + (m1 + k − 1)b3
As the minimum value of
∑
2≤i≤k,i6=pmi is k − 2, the above remains true if we replace∑
2≤i≤k,i6=pmi with k − 2. Further simplification gives
(m1 + k − 2)(b2 − b4 − c0) > 0
Since m1 + k − 2 > 0 is positive (as m1 ≥ 1 and k ≥ 3), we must have
c0 < b2 − b4 (E.5)
Case (ii) mk = m1: It can be similarly shown that Equation (E.5) is the sufficient condition.
Now that the newly entering node enters in a way such that k-star network is formed, we
have to ensure that no further modifications of links occur so that the network thus formed,
is pairwise stable.
For centers and the corresponding leaf nodes to not delete the link between
them: It can be easily seen that c < b1, a weaker condition than Equation (E.2), is a
sufficient condition to ensure this.
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No center should delete its link with any other center: This is ensured by the in-
equalities in the proof of Lemma 1, which are weaker than Equations (E.1) and (E.2).
Leaf nodes of a center should not form a link with each other: The net benefit
that a leaf node would get by forming such a link should be non-positive.
b1 − c− b2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ c ≥ b1 − b2
which is satisfied by Equation (E.2).
Leaf nodes of different centers should not form a link with each other: This is
ensured by the inequality in the proof of Lemma 1, which is weaker than Equations (E.1)
and (E.2).
Link between a center and a leaf node of any other center should not be created:
Let Ci be the center under consideration and the leaf node under consideration be linked
to Cj (j 6= i). There are two ways to ensure this. First is to ensure that a center neither
proposes nor accepts a link with a leaf node of any other center. This mathematically is
(k − 1 +mi + 1)(b1 − c) + b2(
∑
1≤q≤k
q 6=i
mq − 1)
< (k − 1 +mi)(b1 − c) + b2
∑
1≤q≤k
q 6=i
mq
⇐⇒ c > b1 − b2
An alternative to this condition is to ensure that a leaf node neither proposes nor accepts
a link with a center to which it is not connected, but since this condition is already satisfied
by Equation (E.2), this alternative need not be considered.
Equations (E.1), (E.2), (E.3), (E.4) and (E.5) give the required sufficient conditions for
the k-star network topology.
F Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 There exists an O(µk+2) polynomial time algorithm to compute the graph edit
distance between a graph g and a k-star graph with same number of nodes as g, where µ is
the number of nodes in g.
Proof Assume that the mapping of the k centers of the k-star network to the nodes in g,
is known. Let us call these nodes of g as pseudo-centers. The graph edit distance can be
computed by taking the minimum number of edge edit operations over all possible mappings.
In a k-star graph, each node, other than centers, is allotted to exactly one center. Hence,
our objective is to allot nodes, other than pseudo-centers, (call them pseudo-leaves) in g to
pseudo-centers such that the graph edit distance is minimized. Let µ and ξ be the number
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Figure 10: Formulation of graph edit distance between graph g (µ = 10) and a 3-star graph
with same number of nodes as g, as a max-flow problem
of nodes and edges in g, respectively. Let vacancy of a pseudo-center at any point of time
be defined as the maximum number of nodes that can be allotted to it, given the current
allotment. Note that if µ is not a multiple of k, the vacancy of a pseudo-center depends not
only on the number of pseudo-leaves allotted to it, but also on the number of pseudo-leaves
allotted to other pseudo-centers.
It is clear that if the mapping of the k centers is known, for transforming g to a cor-
responding k-star, it is necessary that all missing links between any two pseudo-centers be
added (let β1 be the number of such links) and all existing links between any two pseudo-
leaves be deleted (let β2 be the number of such links). The only other links that need to
be computed for additions or deletions, in order to minimize graph edit distance, are those
interlinking pseudo-leaves with pseudo-centers. The number of links that already interlink
pseudo-leaves with pseudo-centers in g is β3 = (ξ−β2−(
(
k
2
)
−β1)). Say the number of these
edges that are retained during the transformation to k-star, is f , that is, exactly f pseudo-
leaves are allotted a pseudo-center and (µ−k−f) are not. So the number of edges interlinking
pseudo-leaves with pseudo-centers, that are deleted during the transformation, is (β3 − f).
Also, the number of edges to be added in order to allot the pseudo-leaves, that are not allot-
ted to any pseudo-center, to some pseudo-center having a positive vacancy, is (µ−k−f). So
the number of edge edit operations is (β1+β2+β3+µ−k−2f) = (µ+ξ+2β1−k2 (k+1)−2f).
Given a mapping of the k centers, the only variable in this expression is f . So in order to
minimize its value, we need to maximize the number of edges interlinking pseudo-leaves and
pseudo-centers, that remain intact after the transformation to k-star. We now address this
problem of maximizing f .
Let the number of nodes in g be µ = pk + q where p and q are integers such that p ≥ 0
and 1 ≤ q < k. In a k-star graph with µ nodes, q centers are linked to p leaf nodes and the
remaining k − q are linked to p − 1 leaf nodes. So for transforming g to a corresponding
k-star graph, q pseudo-centers should be allotted p pseudo-leaves and the remaining k − q
should be allotted p−1. So, at most q pseudo-centers should be allotted p nodes, that is, the
vacancy of at most q pseudo-centers should be p, while that of the remaining k − q should
be p − 1. In other words, to start with, the sum of vacancies of any q + 1 pseudo-centers
should be at most (q + 1)p− 1.
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The above problem can be formulated as an application of max-flow in a directed net-
work. Figure 10 shows the formulation for a graph g with 10 nodes and a 3-star graph,
where p = 3 and q = 1. The edges directing from the source node s to the left k nodes in
Box 1 (here k = 3) and those in Boxes 1, 2 and 3, formulate the vacancy of each of these
pseudo-centers to be p. Boxes 1, 2 and 3 formulate the constraint that the sum of vacancies
of any q+ 1 pseudo-centers should be at most (q+ 1)p−1. The rightmost Box 4 is obtained
by considering edges only interlinking any pseudo-centers (left nodes) and pseudo-leaves
(right nodes).
As all the edges have integer capacities, the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm constructs an
integer maximum flow. The number of constraints concerning the sum of vacancies of
pseudo-centers is
(
k
q + 1
)
and number of edges added per such constraint is 2(q + 1) + 2.
So the maximum number of edges, say χ, in the max-flow formulation, is k (from source
node to left k nodes in Box 1) + (2(q + 1) + 2)
(
k
q + 1
)
(from the above calculation) +
k(µ − k) (upper limit on the number of edges in Box 4, interlinking pseudo-centers and
pseudo-leaves) + (µ−k) (number of edges directing towards target node). Since 1 ≤ q < k,
we have χ = O(k
k
2
+1 + µk). As the value of the maximum flow is upper bounded by µ− k,
the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm runs in O(χµ) = O(µk
k
2
+1 + µ2k) time. Furthermore, as k is
a constant, the asymptotic worst-case time complexity is O(µ2).
So given a mapping of the k centers, the number of edge edit operations, (µ + ξ +
2β1−k2 (k + 1)− 2f), is minimized since f is maximized. The time complexity of the above
algorithm is dominated by the max-flow algorithm. The above analysis was assuming that
the mapping of the k centers of the k-star network to the nodes in G, is known. The graph
edit distance can, hence, be computed by taking the minimum edit distance over all
(
µ
k
)
= O(µk) possible mappings. So the asymptotic worst-case time complexity of the algorithm
is O(µk+2) = O(µO(1)), since k is a constant.
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